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This thesis examines the current trends within the United States to move 
towards greater dependence on the commercial sector for military defense. Dual-
use technologies impact the Defense acquisition process. It will discuss the risks 
associated with the migration of a defense industrial· base to one of a national 
industrial base. Research will include conducting a thorough literature search, 
review of historical dual-use issues as well as defense and commercial initiatives 
in this area. Dual-use technologies can come in the form of CI or NDI. These 
items have the potential to save the program manager quite a bit of money, 
especially in the dev~lopment costs. However, some would argue that these items 
might not be able to satisfy the peculiar environment required 'by the military. 
Others contend this to be the best method of procurement during this dwindling 
budget era. As DoD continues to rely on dual-use items, commercial sector 
initiatives gain ~omentum, partic~lady in the form of best practices. The program 
manager faces numerous challenges in employing dual-use technology. 
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The purpose of this research is to analyze the current trends within the DoD 
to move towards greater dependence on the commercial sector for military 
Defense items. This thesis examines the current dual-use strategy for the United 
States. First, it will explore the historical context from which the term dual-use 
technology emanated. Then it will delve into what the current philosophy on dual-
use technology is. Next it will analyze several key issues associated with dual-use 
technology. Finally, this thesis offers some conclusions and recommendations 
concerning these issues.' 
This research will also examine the potential of dual-use items in a possible 
acquisition strategy. The goal is to evaluate the risks and benefits associated with 
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dual-use technologies and determine their usefulness for application in the 
Defense acquisition process. Dual-use technologies impact the Defense acquisition 
·process. This thesis will discuss the risks associated with the migration of a 
Defense industrial base to a national industrial base. 
This thesis includes a list of the research questions addressed and discusses 
the scope, the limitations and the assumptions made during the formulation of the 
thesis. ' Research will include conducting a thorough literature search, review of 
historical dual-use issues as well as Defense and commercial initiatives in this 
area. This chapter includes a brief summary about the thesis methodology as well 
as the organization of the thesis. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The ending of the Cold War marked a significant change in the way the 
U.S. purchased items. It was the beginning of the end of "business as usual." The 
U.S. Defense industrial base has undergone some radical changes. Traditionally 
Defense contractors have merged or converted much of their capabilities toward 
, the commercial sector. This phenomenon has given way to mandates tn consider 
acquisition of dual-use technology. 
Dual-use technologies can come in the form of commercial items (CI) or 
nondevelopmental items (NDI). Commercial items are those that have been sold 
to the general public. Nondevelopmental items are those previously developed 
items. These items have the potential to save the program manager quite a bit of 
money, especially in the development costs. However, some· would argue that 
these items might not be able to perform satisfactorily in the peculiar environment 
required by the military .. Others contend that maximizing dual-use technology is 
the best method of procurement during this dwindling budget era. As DoD 
continues to rely on dual-use items, the momentum increases to exploit the 
initiatives of th~ commercial sector. However, the program manager faces 
numerous challenges in employing dual-use technology. 
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A thorough analysis of dual-use technology would not be complete without 
an explanation of the role of technology transfer. During the Cold War, .the U.S. 
Government led the c~mmercial sector in technological. developments. Many 
spin-off technologies were translated from their military role into a commercial 
use. In addition, technologies were transferred between nations. Of great concern 
is the potential leakage of critical military technologies into the hands of foreign 
governments. However, in efforts to maximize the budget, the Do~ has to look to 
"spin-on" technologies and transfer the commercial technology to the military use. 
Some fear the further loss of U.S. technological superiority. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this study is to.provide an overview of the current 
trends within the United States to move towards greater dependence on the 
commercial sector for military Defense. Another objective is to detennine the 
risks and benefits associated with dual-use technology as well as the migration of 
a Defense industrial base to one of a national industrial base. These insights can 
then be utilized to help program mahagers make decisions regarding the use of 
dual-use technologies within their acqui"sition strategy. These concepts can then 
be used in other major I)efense acquisition programs to build upon the successes 
of program offices and maximize the effectiveness of acquisition refonn initatives. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is dual-use technology and how has it impacted program 
management? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
• What is the application of dual-use technology? How does dual-use 
technology apply to program management? 
• What is the relationship between the trend toward a national 
industrial base vice a Defense industrial base and dual-use 
technology? 
• How do commercial items (CI) and non-developmental items (NDI) 
relate to dual-use technology? 
• What are the significant differences in procuring these items? 
• What is the impact of dual-use technology on the PMO and does it 
pose any significant problems for the program manager? 
• What is the. relationship between dual-use technologies and 
technology transfer? . 
• Could the U.S. Military lose its technological, competitive edge over 
its adversaries due to its dual-use initiatives? 
E. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The scope will include: (1) a review of dual-use technology related 
documents, (2) an historical review of dual-use technology, (3) a review of current 
initiatives and practices in this arena, (4) a review of issues relating to specific 
dual-use technologies, specifically, (a) an analysis of the dual-use technology 
decisions made in a program office; (b) an analysis of dual-use employment 
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strategy; and (c) an analysis of the resources available to a Program Manager and 
his staff to employ dual-use technology. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
The basis for this research is current literature, regulations, acquisition 
documents, and interviews. Furthennore, the methodology used in this thesis 
research will consist of the following steps: 
• A literature search of books, magazine articles, electronic database 
systems, and other library infonnation resources. 
• A review of dual-use technology and technology transfer related 
documents. 
• Interviews with personnel from National and service level dual-use 
technology and technology transfer specific organizations. 
• Site-visits to a program office that is either using, preparing to use or 
even considering using dual-use technologies in order to observe 
processes and considerations for their employment. 
• An analysis of research results. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I presents the introduction along with the basic research questions, 
the scope and method of research for this thesis. 
Chapter II presents background infonnation on dual-use technology. This 
chapter explains the historical context from which dual-use technology emanated 
during the Cold War. 
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Chapter III explains and examines the current trends in the Defense 
acquisition policy concerning dual-use technology. 
Chapter IV an~lyzes the key dual-use technology issues as well as the 
lessons learned in applying these technologies in a program. 
Chapter V addresses conclusions and recommendation on dual-use 
technology employment in the program office. It answers the research questions. 
This chapter further provides recommended areas for additional study. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has briefly introduced dual-use technology and its potential 
application in a program office. Furthermore, it has outlined, the format of the 
thesis, the researche'r's primary and secondary research questions, as well as the 
scope and objective of the study. It has also addressed the methodology and 
organization of the thesis. The next chapter provides a detailed explanation about 
the background of dual-use technology. 
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY: 
THE TRANSFER "OUT" OF TECHNOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses and defines dual-use technology in the old way of 
thinking. It reflects upon the history of dual-use technology in the era of the 1970s 
and 1980s, demonstrating the primary concern to the Program Manager as being 
the transfer "out" of technology. This chapter discusses how technology transfer 
occurs, causing the potential "leakage" of dual-use technologies. First, the 
background concerning technology transfer is laid out. Then, cooperative efforts 
ar~ explained in detail. Finally, the chapter discusses how foreign military sales 
(FMS) fit into this potential transfer. All of these efforts relate to the denial of 
technology, a planned technology transfer, or the avoidance of an unplanned or 
inadvertent leak of a dual-use technology. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND PERSPECTIVE OF nUAL-USE 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
The term dual-use technology is used in several different ways. The first 
meaning for dual-use technologies arose during the Cold War. Essentially, dual-
use technology generally applied to foreign nations admitting the use of, or 
requesting a technology for one purpose. However, that technology also had 
potentially other military or malicious implications. This was the most common 
understanding of the term dual-use technology as used in the intelligence 
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community. Prior to the fall of the former Soviet Union, dual-use technologies 
implied just that: peaceful technologies being used for a malicious end. 
One example is nuclear technologies used for producing inexpensive 
electricity. The same technologies used in cyclotrons and particle separators are 
also used in the production of nuclear weapons. Another probably more familiar 
example includes the so-called "baby milk factories" of Iraq. Similar 
pasteurization-type devices can also be used for the production of biological 
agents. Figure 2-1 graphically portrays this comparison of dual-use technologies. 
Traditional Dual-Use Technology 
Technologl: Malicious Use Peaceful Use 
Cyclotron & Nuclear Nuclear Power 
Particle Weapons 
Separators 
Pasteurization Biological "Baby Milk" 
Devices Agents 
Launch & Missiles CommunIcations 
Guidance Satellites 
Technologies 
Source: Researcher Figure 2-1 
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Finally, many nations desire to take advantage of all the benefits associated 
with the use of satellites. They want to be able to employ satellites unilaterally, 
and not be dependent pn other nations. However, the obvious peaceful use for 
these technologies is communication. The same technologies used for launching 
satellites also deliver Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). 
Another example of the denial of dual-use technologies includes protecting 
critical technologies. The intelligence community is ever vigilant of the nations 
belonging to the "haves" and "have-nots" associated with these technologies. The 
Missile Technologies Control Regime (MTCR) employs strict constraints on the 
exports of "missile technologies," closely monitoring their transactions. The U.S., 
along with the other member nations, meticulously monitors these transfers. 
All the above examples pose legitimate, peaceful uses for the technologies 
desired by many nations. These processes and products described, having both 
civilian and military· use, are considered dual-use. Ultimately, military and 
malicious uses ,of these dual-use, technologies are of great concern to the U.S. 
Government. Particularly, concern for their unintended use or the inadvertent 
leakage/disclosure of a superior, leading-edge technology results in careful 
contemplation before technology release. This arena explains the "denial" aspect 
of dual-use technology. 
During the Cold War, the Program Manager had to take great care in 
recommending what technologies had potential for unintended or malicious use. 
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He carefully planned his acquisition strategy to prevent the unintended use of his 
"technologies." Did the technologies have a "dual-use?" Could they be used in 
other methods than their intended purpose? Finally, were they a "critical" 
technology? During the Cold War, the PM mitigated these risks through 
avoidance. Tighter program and acquisition controls meant greater costs for the 
program, as some of the opportunities or benefits of cooperative efforts of foreign 
military sales were lost. 
Historically, the definition of dual-use technology sounded like a simple 
concept. As stated earlier, it specifically pertained to foreign countries using U.S. 
friepdly technologies for malicious ends. However, numerous issues surround the 
subject matter of dual-use technology emanatin.g from a particular program. These 
issues include routine technology transfer as well as foreign military sales. These 
areas are of concern to the Program Manager and his staff, and deserve some 
explanation. Looking at technology transfer, and in particular FMS, reveals great 
insight into the historical approach to dual-use technology in a program. These 
areas constitute the "denial" aspect of dual-use technology. 
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C. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
1. Background 
The intent of this section is to lay the foundation of technology transfer 
under the auspices of dual-use technology for application by a PM and his 
program office staff. It will explore the issues encompassing technology transfer. 
Later analy~is will expound on some of its ramifications on the program office. 
Simply stated, technology transfer is the spread of a technology that has 
already been developed and proven. Technology transfer can include anything 
from a manufacturing process to a new composite material. Although, this 
transfer mayor may not include dual-use technologies, the technology transfer 
applications in this thesis specifically pertain to dual-use technologies. 
Technology transfer has both a "denial" facet and also a "use" aspect 
(which will be discussed in detail in a later chapter). So why is technology 
transfer so important to a Program Manager? The "denial" aspects of dual~use 
technology caution the Program Manager from leaking critical technologies. Yet, 
Chapter III will demonstrate that the "use" side of technology transfer can provide 
valuable benefits. The Program Manager needs to understand how technology 
transfer fits into his program. As stated earlier, there are several nuances of 
technol~gy transfer that may be helpful to the Program Manager when h~ is 
deciding to employ technology transfer in his acquisition strategy, and if so, how 
to use it. 
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The "denial" facet of the technology transfer aspect of dual-use technology 
concerns itselfwith that te~hnology transferred out from a program. Of concern to 
the PM is his program being the purveyor of technology. Essentially, he defines 
the critical technologies that are not to be leaked outside his organization. The 
Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM) provides a list of 
technology transfer methods (Meuschke, 1996): 
• Commercial and Government Sales 
• Scientist, Engineer, Student, and Academic Exchanges 
• Consulting Agreements 
• Licensing and other Data Exchange Agreements 
• Co-development and Co-production Agreements 
• Trade Fairs, Exhibits, and Air shows 
• Sales to Third Party Nations 
• Multinational Corporation Transfers 
• International Meetings and Symposia on Advanced Technology 
• ~landestine or Illegal· Acquisition of Military or Dual-use 
Technology or Equipment 
• Dissemination of Technical Reports under 0000 5400.7, Freedom 
of Information Act Program 
• Dummy Corporations 
• Acquiring. an Interest in U.S. Industry, Business, and other 
organizations 
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Since dual-use technologies creep-up in all of these areas, one must ask the 
gnawing question: So, how do these concerns about dual-use technology impact a 
PM and his staff? Preventing others from access to a particular technology 
becomes paramount in an acquisition strategy. Although he must remain wary of 
all of the above with respect to the denial aspect of dual-use technology, the PM 
has two primary concerns specifically pertaining to the production and quality of 
his program. Understanding thes~ concerns explains how the technologies can be 
transferred. 
The actual transfer of technology may occur during cooperative efforts or 
during foreign military sales (FMS). On the surface, both provide advantages to 
the PM. In a cooperative effort, the program office saves by not having to bear the 
burden of the entire cost of program development. In addition, FMS can also help 
spread the costs of production over a greater yield. Either of these. methods can 
provide numerous benefits to the PM. However, the PM must be conscious of the 
technology transfer ramifications in order to avoid inadvertent disclosure of 
sensitive or classified materials. 
2. Cooperative Efforts 
Cooperative efforts between the U.S. and other countries provide many 
benefits for the PM. Life-cycle cost reductions, quality improvements, delivery 
enhancements, dual-sourcing, providing for surge requirement, if needed, and an 
overall reduction in risk are some of the potential benefits of a cooperative 
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program. (Mueschke, 1996) However, the program office must provide early and 
meticulous planning to ensure a smooth transfer of technology during the 
cooperative effort. Furthermore, the type of technology will generally determine 
how the program office transfers the technology. 
Transfer methods provide the venue for technology transfer of dual-use 
technology. Generally, international technology transfer may occur in three 
different manners: Contractor-to-Contractor; Contractor-to-G~vernment; or 
Government-to-Government (Matthews, 1997). These transfer methods are 
ordered based on their increasing level of technology (state-of-the-art), and 
deserve further analysis as they pertain to cooperative efforts. 
First, Contractor-to-Contractor transfer is one where the contractor has the 
greatest level of autonomy with very little Governmental oversight. This method 
allows contractors to develop working relationships in related fields. Next, a 
Contractor-to-Government transfer has increased Governmental oversight. More 
agencies become involved, and therefore communication problems increase. 
Finally, a Government-to-Government transfer involves the greatest level of 
Governmental oversight and is used primarily for major weapon system transfers. 
In each of the three methods of international technology transfer, as well as 
in domestic technology transfer, three transfer mechanisms exist: Direct 
Licensing; Contractor Teaming; and Leader-Follower. All of these mechanisms 
deserve an explanation. First, Direct Licensing is basically the selling of 
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technology, usually involving patents and payments of royalties. An organization 
can use direct licensing to obtain dual-sourcing. Contractor Teaming is the shared 
development and ownership of a technology, allowing for design specialization. 
Contractor teaming is a direct transfer from contractor to contractor. Finally, the 
Leader-Follower transfer mechanism is a relatively fast method best used for 
complex systems. It involves one contractor as the primary developer with 
another contractor that follows suit. 
3. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
Another issue surrounding the transfer of dual-use technology out of a 
program involves foreign military sales, as discussed briefly earlier. FMS can 
provide amazing benefits to not only the program office but to the entire U.S. 
industrial base as well. According to the introductory studies . of Systems 
Acquisition and Program Management, there are several basic reasons for FMS 
(Matthews, 1997): 
• Promot~ U.S. Security by Arming Allies with interoperable 
Equipment 
• Keep U.S. Production Base "Warm" 
• .Reduce U.S. Procurement Unit Costs 
• Help U.S. Economy aO(~ Balance of Trade 
• "Influence, Influence, Influence" 
The United States has been rather successful in FMS endeavors. Recently, 
the United States has provided as much as 70 percent of the worldwide weapons 
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market (Beard, 1995). Although the perceived imbalance is a very contentious 
issue in the international political arena, the PM generally needs to focus on how 
FMS can benefit his production. However, he must struggle with the implications 
of leaking critical technologies or selling technologies to be used for unintended 
purposes. 
Recent headlines in Defense News proclaimed that the U.S. Government is 
going to "overhaul" its official FMS program as it continues to dissatisfy current 
and potential purchasing nations. Although bureaucratic systems often have room 
for improvement, the FMS progra.m has been successful for many years, as stated 
earlier. The same article presents FMS receipts in 1997 at $8.8 billion (U.S.), 
albeit considerably lower than the "$33 billion in 1993 contracts that were si~ed 
in the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War." Such numbers would be expected 
considering the international environment at that time. 
Still, overhauled FMS or not, a Program Manager and his staff must still 
consider the dual-use implication~ of FMS on their program. Yet, FMS are not 
. . 
quite as simple as producing additional items to sell to a foreign country. The 
Program Manager is suddenly confronted with imbedded issues ranging from 
technology transfer of dual-use technologies to the incredible interdependence of 
the global economy. Combined, these issues add an additional layer of 
responsibility on the already over-burdened program office staff. 
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An effective Program Manager who undertakes foreign military sales 
during the life cycle of his program may secure tremendous gains in his program 
overall, similar to that of technology transfer. However, as stated earlier, foreign 
military sales need to be better understood by the PM. Why would a PM even 
bother with the difficulties associated with FMS? 
As the Defense budget continues to dwindle, so too will the procurement 
quantities. In addition, the fall of the former Soviet Union has le~ to a glut of 
state-of-the-art weaponry for sale. These factors have combined to push forward 
the sale of modem U.S. weapons to foreign countries, since the U.S. will sell 
technology that they would otherwise be reluctant to sell. Basically, the U.S. 
needed to decide to stay competitive in FMS by making some of U.S. state-of-the-
art weapons for sale. In addition, FMS customers may like U.S. equipment 
because it seemed to work well in Southwest Asia arid because they know they can 
obtain decent logistical support. Thus, shrinking Defense dollars have resulted in 
attractive FMS opportunities to international customers. This has also proved 
beneficial to the PM whose funds may. have been reduced. That PM can now buy 
more weapons at a cheaper unit cost due to the overall increase in procurement 
from foreign sales. Furthermore, if a PM's production dollars dry-up one year, the 
contractor's factory might continue to produce for foreign customers, keeping alive 
the U.S. Defense industrial base. When that PM receives his production money, 
he can then benefit from the already producing "warm" factory as well as sharing 
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the benefits o.f the learning curve. Ideally, the co.ntracto.r will be able to make the 
product faster and better than the last batch o.f systems. 
The benefits o.f FMS do. no.t co.me to the PM without a price. The price to. 
the PM is in understanding the co.mplex expo.rt system fo.r military items. So.me o.f 
the players invo.lved in FMS include the fo.llo.wing: 
• The President 
• Natio.nal Security Co.uncil 
• Co.ngress 
• Department o.f State 
• Department o.f Co.mmerce 
• Department o.f Defense 
• Office o.f Management and Budget 
The· PM can never underestimate the po.wer o.f do.mestic and internatio.nal 
po.litics o.n FMS, as well as organizatio.nal and cultural dynamics. Thus, in 
additio.n to. the co.mplex o.pinio.ns o.n the definitio.ns o.f critical techno.lo.gies, the 
PM has to. remain o.n schedule wo.rking within the co.nfines o.f such an unwieldy 
bureaucracy. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The primary co.ncern abo.ut dual-use techno.lo.gies fo.r Program Managers 
befo.re Acquisitio.n Refo.rm was that of denying certain techno.logies to. fo.reign 
entities. Critical techno.lo.gies were held close and the dual-use aspt:ct came abo.ut 
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when friendly or pe~ceful technologies were used for unintended military or 
malicious purposes. The transfer of technology during cooperative efforts as well 
as FMS demonstrates the ,"denial" of dual-use technologies: This imperative 
throughout any program was significant during the Cold War. 
This chapter explained dual-use technology and its role in the program 
office before Acquisition Reform. The transfer of technology emanating from a 
program office came about generally through cooperative efforts or foreign 
military sales. This chapter explained how Program Managers considered dual-
use technologies in each of these areas. Thus, the desired result of PM analysis of 
du~l-use technologies was to deny the release of sensitive technology. Through 
these channels, the PM could also plan a tra~sfer of non-critical technology, as 
well as avoid the risks of an unplanned or inadvertent leak of a critical, dual-use 
technology. The next chapter details the current ideas concerning dual-use 




III. THE "USE" ASPECTS OF DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter defines and discusses the current trend in the technology 
transfer of dual-use technology. In other words, the "use" aspects of dual-use 
technology imply how a program manager (PM) can use dual-use technologies to 
meet his acquisition strategy. It also discusses some of the documents and 
legislation concerning the political atmosphere of dual-use technology in light of 
today's reduced budget era. Additionally, it discusses several courses of action 
that will help the program manager to decide on employment of dual-use 
technology. It also reviews applications of dual-:-use technology as well as a 
current program involving dual-use technology. Finally, this ch~pter discusses 
how commercial and nondevelopmental items fit into dual-use technology. 
B. CURRENT TRENDS 
The current trend in technology transfer in dual-use technologies involves 
the transfer of technology into a program from the civilian application. Receiving 
technology generally has positive aspects for a PM. Howeve~, ten yea~s ago, 
research would primarily divulge concerns only about international technology 
transfer. Currently, in the United States Government and academia, research 
indicates a growing slant towards sharing this knowledge base. Executive Order 
(EO) 12591 mandates technology transfer (Appendix A). While addressing the 
issue of international transfers, EO 12591 emphatically pursues the concept of 
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domestic technology transfer between Federal, state and local governments, 
universities, and the private sector, to include both Defense industries and small 
businesses as well (DTIC, 1997). A greater cooperative effort will result in lower 
costs for DoD and a stronger national Defense industrial base. 
This current trend is predicated on the "use" aspect of technology transfer, 
or rather, dual-use technologies. 1 Dual-use technologies manifest themselves in 
technology transfer as the Department of Defense (DoD) further encourages 
cooperative technological efforts. According to Doctor Perry's June 1995 
memorandum (Appendix B), that message is clear about technology. DoD's 
acquisition programs must recognize the current technologies of the national 
industrial base. When new technologies are developed, they should be dual-use 
tech~ologies (DTIC, 1997). Note here· that historically when we think of 
technology, our minds think of items like circuit boards and such. Technology 
however, may also be processes, software, and intellectual property, as well. Any 
and all of these technologies may be beneficial to the PM. 
The executive branch is not alone in embracing technology transfer as a 
beneficial process. The Congress demonstrates an understanding of technology 
transfer too. Albeit, this is their current position on technology transfers, it has 
evolved. over time. Chart 1 briefly outlines the legislation involving technology 
I The term technology transfer often implies dual-use technology according to the framework of this thesis. 
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transfer as it is portrayed in the dual-use umbrella (DTIC, 1997). (See Appendix C 
for further details.) 
Chart 1 
Technology Transfer Legislative History 
• Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (PL 96-480)[15 USC 
3701-3714] 
• Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (PL 96-517) 
• Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 (PL 97-219) 
• Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (PL 98-462) 
• Trademark Clarification Act of 1984 (PL 98-620) 
• Japanese Technical Literature Act of 1986 (PL 99-382) 
• Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (PL 99-502) 
• Malcom Baldrige National Quality Improvement Act of 1987 (PL 100-107) 
• Executive Orders 12591 and 12618 (1987): Facilitating Access to Science and 
Technology 
• Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (PL 100-418) 
• National Institute of Standards and Technology Authorization Act for FY 1989 
(PL 100-519) 
• Water Resources Development Act of 1988 (PL 100-676) 
• National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act of 1989 (PL 101-189) 
(included as Section 3131 et seq. of DoD Authorization Act for FY 1990) 
• Defense Authorization Act for FY1991 (PL 101-510) 
• Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (PL 102-240) 
• American Preeminence Act 1991 (PL 102-245) 
• Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Program 1992 (PL 102-564) 
23 
• National Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1993 (PL 102-25) 
• National Department of Defense Authorization Act for FY 1993 (PL 102-484) 
• National Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1994 (PL 103-160) 
• National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (PL 104-113) 
[also known as the "Morella Act"] 
This brief legislative history emphasizes two underlying aspects of 
technology transfer. First, technology transfer is not a new concept. Congress 
passed The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 almost 20 
years ago. Second, current legislation continues to revitalize and expand dual-use 
technology programs, specifically technology transfer programs. In addition, a 
plethora of information on policy memorandums exists. A quick search of the 
DoD and other Federal Internet sites reveals more dual-use technology 
information than one could conceivable digest coherently at one sitting. Thus, 
Congress is very active in dual-use technology based on the amount of laws and 
reports generated by them. 
There are clearly some DoD technologies that were commercialized, 
resulting in benefits for both the commercial sector as well as DoD. These dual-
use technologies are gen~rally categorized as "spin-off' technologies. See Chart 2 
for some examples of these technologies (NEe, 1995). 
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Chart 2 
Benefits of Commercializing DoD Technologies 
Many TRP projects "spin ofr Defense technologies to strengthen important Defense 
producers and lower the cost to the military. 
DOD TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIAL BENEFITS DEFENSE BENEFITS 
Uncooled infrared sensors Night driving assistance Order of magnitude lower 
Security surveillance cost for night vision 
Collision avoidance systems technology 
, Locating power and thermal leaks 
Integrated millimeter wave Airline safety during inclement Enables military use of poor 
radar/ infrared sensor for weather landing strips for combat 
landing guidance system support 
Lasers Laser machining (improved Improved low-rate production 
precision in cutting and welding, of military systems (e.g." 
less machining required) military aircraft, ship, vehicle 
production). Lasers for 
"blinding" sensors of 
incoming missiles 
Acoustic signal processing Just-in-time maintenance on Replacement of critical 
and diagnostics shafts, power generation systems helicopter rotor components 
(turbines, generators) prior to failure 
Enhanced Position Location Advanced automatic train 40% cost reduction in 
Reporting System controls battlefield location system 
Fly-by-light Alternative to fly-by-wire Invulnerability to 
electromagnetic pulse, RF 
interference 
Pyrotechnics Rescue equipment Preserve on-shore Defense 
industry 
Amorphous silicon Medical imaging Battlefield casualty 
technology diagnostics, teleradiometry 
Nuclear submarine valve Zero emission control valves Reduce cost, preserve 
technology (e.g., refineries, chemical supplier 
transport) 
Advanced polymer' Bridge, infrastructure repair Availability, affordability for 
composites ' high performance advanced 
composites; portable tactical 
bridges 
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Similarly, there have been quite a few commercial technologies leveraged 
specifically for the benefi,t of DoD. These "spin-on" technologies are of great 
interest to the program manager for obvious reasons. Chart 3 enumerates several 
of these technologies (NEC, 1995). 
Chart 3 
Leveraging Commercial Technologies for Defense 
TRP "spin-on' projects provide the DoD with superior technology that will be sustained by 
dynamic commercial markets. 
COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGIES DEFENSE BENEFITS 
Electric and hybrid propulsion (e.g., Enabling technology for armored, tactical 
turboalternators, propulsion systems) vehicles (acceleration, rough terrain 
capability, on-board power, silent running, 
fuel efficiency, design flexibility) 
Advanced batteries Reduce logistical burden from increased 
demand for portable electric power on 
battlefield 
Healthcare technologies (digital X-Rays, Trauma care under battlefield conditions 
telemedicine, noninvasive organ to save lives through intervention during 
sensors/diagnostics, oxygen generator, "golden hour"; virtual physician presence; 
biological modeling) measurement/transmission of vital signs 
C41 (self healing networks, voice Affordable, updateable, high bandwidth, 
recognition systems, spatial division wireless networks to serve highly mobile 
multiple access technology) stations 
Nuclear, biological and chemical detection Accurate detection and remote monitoring 
(infrared and ultraviolet sensors; mass for chemical and biological agents 
spectrometry; chemical ar hiological agent 
sampling, collection, and : c.lpping) 
Electronics design and manufacturing Ability to integrate optical information 
(optoelectronics, low-cost packaging) into electronics systems; affordability 
through adopting commercial, low-cost 
electronic packaging techniques 
Ultrasonics Ability to determine aircraft wing icing 
potential prior to takeoff; particularly 
applicable to secondary airfields 
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Since the trend in acquisition reform today is to embrace dual-use 
technology application, it is imperative to demonstrate to the program office 
exactly why it is so important. An effective program office employing robust 
technology transfer constraints throughout the life cycle of the program may 
garner enormous benefits in the program. Understanding technology transfer and 
its related issues provides a great deal of insight into successful employment of 
dual-use technologies and strategies to counter some potential drawbacks. 
However, the concepts surrounding dual-use technology transfer are not as clear-
cut as one may think. 
C. DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY "USE" IN A PROGRAM 
As alluded to in Chapter II, the main concern for Program Managers 
concerning dual-use technology is how they can take advantage 'of existing, 
leading-edge technology. Several trends exist in today's world that will help the 
PM decide which path to choose. First, the increasing partnership between 
government and industry broadens a commercial sector helping the Defense 
industry. Second, the particular contractors involved, especially the prime 
contractor, may provide valuable insight, too. Third, combined. efforts between 
DoD and industry demonstrate future willingness by industry to partner with DoD. 
The international treaty implications of technology transfer and dual-use 
technologies are far reaching, as too are the political ramifications at the 
governmental level. However, what does deserve more analysis is the civilian 
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uses of military items and military use of civilian items. Thus, these applications 
foster the advancement of dual-use technology employment. It is here where the 
PM can directly influence those issues that promptly affect him. An extension of 
this issue is the implication for the Defense industrial base. 
An earlier section revealed the sentiment of the Administration and the 
Secretary of Defense, as well as the Legislature. It is clear that the political 
atmosphere supports the dual-use agenda. With acquisition reform and massive 
commercial sector mergers in the Defense industry further affecting the program 
office's daily activities, one question comes to mind. Does the U.S. still require a 
Defense industrial base? Although a full and complete answer is well beyond the 
scope of this thesis, this issue deserves some discussion. 
The co-production of military and commercial items sounds very appealing 
in this acquisition era. This, in fact, may strengthen the U.S. Defense industrial 
base. In the past, the DoD pushed technology in many areas, leading in the 
research and development area. I~ this time of constrained budgets, the DoD has 
to rely on the civilian sector to push the technological envelope. A collaborative 
effort between the commercial sector and the DoD may be very beneficial to both 
parties, and it is the logical next step in partnering. This arrangement gives DoD 
access to leading-edge technology in the commercial sector. Also the DoD 
obtains more affordable prices as the combined military and commercial demand 
for products and process drh )wn prices. Furthermore, the industrial base will 
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then also be prepared for the time when military situations dictate increased 
production during wartime scenarios. 
One such coop~rative effort was the Technology Reinvestment Program 
started in 1993. Federal money existed for those program offices willing to 
venture into dual-use technologies through this program. One example from this 
program included the widespread use of infrared sensors made ten times cheaper 
by leveraging new commercial technologies. Another example involved the 
computer industry, where vast increases in portable low-cost data storage can give 
front line soldiers immediate a~cess to the best information and intelligence. 
Finally, the most notable dual-use technology developed from the Technology 
Reinvestment Program involved battlefield casualty treatment whereby new 
sensors and information systems greatly improve the ability to find, diagnose and 
treat injured combatants during the first hour they are down in the field.2 
The commercial sector, too, has proven successful in deploying once 
specifically mil,itary technologies. into civilian us~. The FOREW ARN® radar 
system used by Delco in fighter aircraft has been successfully inserted into school 
buses. This radar, adapted and made obviously less expensive, assists the driver in 
verifYing that the traditional blind spot is free of school children. (For school 
buses that is the spot immediately in front of the hood for approximately four to 
2 These examples are compiled from numerous web sites involving both dual-use technologies programs as 
well as the specific items researched. One site is www.acq.osdmillesldutldufinaI8.html. 
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five feet.) Leveraging the uses for this technology suggested the idea for 
automobile makers to adapt it for the passenger car. The automobile industry 
plans to test out this radar integrated into their cruise control mechanism to 
prevent cars from hitting vehicles in their blind spot. Marketed by Delco 
Electronics Systems, FOREWARN® Forward Looking System, Side Detection 
System, and Back-Up Aid System all assist cars in this endeavor.3 
Over time, the TRP has developed into the Dual Use Science and 
Technology Program (DU S&T, 1998). (See Figure 3-1) 
History of Dual-Use at DoD 
TRP 
1993-1996 
-Established by DARPA 
-Developed and Applied 
DUAP 
1997 
-Managed by DARPA/ODR&EI 
Services 
-Increased Service Participation 
-Innovative Agreements -Initiated Service selected 
-Cost sharing 
-Consortia 
Source: DU S&T, 1998 
topics 
-Transitioned all project 














3 This general information was extracted from Delco's website at www.delphianto.comldelcoIForewarn. 
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According to Dr. Jacques Gansler, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology, "The maintenance of our technological superiority 
on future battlefields will depend on our ability to take advantage of technological 
advances occurring in commercial industry. In response, the Department has 
established the Dual Use S&T Program to fund and develop technologies that will 
prove a military advantage on the battlefield and meet the demands of the 
commercial marketplace." 
The Dual· Use Science and Technology Program leverages the costs of 
technology development with industry to reduce cost and increase perfonnance 
and sustainability of Defense systems. In addition, it promotes the culture of dual-
use within the Services in order to satisfy the materiel needs of the future. All of 
the projects emanating from this program are to jointly develop these technologies 
based on funding shared by the DoD and industry. In order to attract the non-
traditional industry contractors and take advantage of their valuable insight, many 
of the FAR requirements are waived to a~d flexibility and efficiency. Of course 
since these are dual-use technologies, they are developed with the intent to meet 
both Defense and commercial industry needs. In addition, as research' dollars 
shrink for both th~ DoD and industry, these scarce dollars can be leveraged more 
effectiv~ly (DU S&T, 1998). 
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Some specific technological subjects lend themselves to a greater extent to 
the dual-use arena. Thus, the DUS&T Program has particular focus areas to 
maximize this commonality. These areas include the following: 
• Affordable Sensors 
• Aircraft Sustainment 
• Distributed Mission Training 
• Fuel Efficiency & Advanced Propulsion 
• Information Systems & Technology 
• Medical Technologies 
• Advanced High Speed Vessels and Structural Systems for Large 
Sea-Based Structures 
• Environmental Monitoring 
. The following minimum requirements exist to ensure the adequacy of the 
mutually beneficial partnership. Obviously, in order to get industry to provide 
their 50% of the cost share, the technology must not only meet military needs, but 
it must also be commercially useful. Contract awards must be based upon full and 
open competition. 
The vision of the Dual Use Science and Technology Program staff, 
according to Dan Petinito, the Program manager, is to have a plethora of 
. technologies readily available. Program managers can then converge on a central 
organization to acquire material solutions for their needs. The critical concept of 
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this program is that a wide range of technologies must be developed to meet future 
needs. There is not a focus on the application. 
The technology program encourages mutually beneficial partnership 
between the DoD and industry. The first two Dual Use Science and Technology 
Program solicitations have resulted in over $500 million invested by the DoD and 
industry (DU S&T, 1998). Based on the interest shown by industry participants of 
the Industry Days conference held in Los Angeles in October 1998, the program 
staff expects many proposals to be submitted prior to the December deadline. 
D. COMMERCIAL AND NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEMS (CI & NDI) 
Based on past ideas as a foundation for Acquisition Reform, a number of 
strategies and control methods either came into being or were strengthened to .. 
. . . 
make the acquisition process more efficient. Examples of the strategies include 
Evolutionary Acquisition (EA), NDI Acquisition, integrated product and process 
development, and acquisition of commercial items on commercial terms. This 
section will specifically focus on the concepts surrounding use of commercial 
items and NDI in an acquisition strategy. 
According to the Defense Acquisition Deskbook (DAD), commercial items 
are any items, other than real property, that are customarily used for non-
governmental purposes and: 
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(I) have been sold, leased, or licensed to the general public; or 
(2) have been offered for sale, lease or license to the general public; or 
any item that evolved through advances in technology or 
performance and that is not yet available in the commercial 
marketplace, but will be available in the commercial marketplace in 
time to satisfy the delivery requirements under a Government 
solicitation (DoD, 1998). 
This definition also includes the services in support of a commercial item, 
or those services offered in substantial quantities, competitively in the commercial 
marketplace based on established catalog or market prices. Modified commercial 
items include both commercial items commonly modified in the commercial 
marketplace or those with minor modifications of a type not normally available in 
the commercial sector in order to meet Government sp"ecifications (DoD, 1998). 
Commercial items are often confused with NDI. Albeit similar, the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation, (FAR), makes a clear distinction between commercial 
items and NDI. Initially, commercial items were considered a subset of NDI 
(DoD, 1998). However, increased desires to field affordable, state-of-the-art 
systems, while emphasizing efficient use of the scarce financ'ial resources of DoD 
resulted in clear delineation between the two approaches. A . brief explanation 
establishing the foundation of the terms presents an excellent starting point before 
discussing the issues associated with dual-use technologies. Figure 3-2 
graphically outlines the basic concepts of both Commercial items and NDI. 
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Fi2ure 3-2. Commercial Item and Nimdevelopmental Item Summary, (DoD, 1998) 
The definition of an NDI is much simpler. A nondevelopmental item is any 
previously developed item of supply used exclusively for government purposes by 
a Federal ag~ncy, a state or local government, or a foreign government with which 
the United States has a mutual Defense cooperation agreement. Also NDI 
includes any item described above that requires only minor modifications or 
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modifications of the type customarily available in the commercial marketplace in 
order to meet the requirements of the processing department or agency (OUSD 
(A&T), 1996). Both commercial and nondevelopmental items may both offer 
technology transfers. Therefore, the question to a program manager becomes can 
or should he use dual-use (either CI or NDI) technologies in his program? 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the current trends in dual-use technology today. It 
demonstrated the commitment by government and political organizations. It also 
depicted how the Technology Reinvestment Program has developed into a new 
application of the DoD dual-use technology effort caIled the Dual Use Science and 
Technology Program. FinaIly, it explained the role of commercial and 
nondevelopmental items within the context of the dual-use technology arena. The 
next chapter will present the analysis of this thesis. 
36 
IV. DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The past two chapters of this thesis described the historical context from 
which dual-use technology emerged. They also described the current inclination in 
DoD today concerning dual-use technology. This chapter discusses key dual-use 
technology issues, including the PM's decision to employ dual-use technology. 
Next it details how PMs go about employing dual-use technology. It then adds an 
analysis of resources available to PMs and their staff, assisting them in dual-use 
technology considerations. Finally, this chapter closes with a look at the Army 
Sniper Rifle case. 
B. KEY DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY ISSUES 
1. The Decision to Employ Dual-Use Technology 
Throughout history, technology has changed warfare. The rifled barrel 
demonstrated to Napoleon that the tight-knit phalanx would no longer be an 
effective battle formation for the infantry. The rifling gave guns a much greater 
range and accuracy, and formations of infantry could be picked-off before they 
lifted their own weapons. to fight. The tank broke the stalemate of trench-warfare 
during W orId War I. Time and time again, technology impacted warfare. Even 
the massive deployment to the Persian Gulf in 1990 heralded some technologies 
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impacting the outcome of the war. For example, some argue that the Allied 
Coalition, principally the United States, owned the night. The U.S. Forces 
equipped with night vision devices inflicted severe casualties on Iraqi forces in 
night battles during the Persian Gulf War. Successful employment of 
technological advantages swayed the outcome in favor of the Coalition Forces. 
New technologies will continue to playa major role in future warfare. 
State, local and civilian organizations have traditionally looked for military 
technologies that could be adapted for civilian use, that is, spin-off technologies. 
Spin-off technology transfer has often been acceptable, and Chapter III 
demonstrates that it is now officially encouraged from not only the Executive 
Branch, but also the Legislative Branch as well. In revers~, the PM must be 
concerned whether what is available commercially can be readily used or adapted 
. . 
to his program. With the current wave of Acquisition Reform and budget 
constraints, dual-use commercial technologies may offer relief to funds-starved 
acq:uisition programs. As alluded to earlier, these dual-use technologies are a 
major factor in te~hnology transfer. Adapting dual-use commercial products may 
save the program research and development costs and at the same time provide 
advanced technology otherwise' unavailable for warfighting systems. . Thus, the 
PM offices must be knowledgeable of the potential military uses of civilian 
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technologies. Defense acquisition will continue to depend on the civilian sector 
for processes and products. 
The above exp.lanation cannot stand-alone. As stated earlier, it is the 
leading edge technologies that are the decisive factors in war. If the United States 
never pushed technology forward, the National Defense would become stagnant, 
while other countries developed a decisive edge. This sounds like double talk to a 
PM. So where does this apparent dichotomy of priorities leave the PM? Actually, 
it is a balancing act for the PM. He must stay aware of the current technological 
trends in warfighting systems arid associated processes relevant to his program. 
He may decide to use that commercial or NDI technology. Then again, he may 
decide the cost does not have a sufficient benefit. Thus, he must initiate a full-
scale development program. Figure 4-1 e~plains that even in these situations, a 
PM should consider dual-use technologies for sub-systems or components. 
For example, a current trend in making automobile parts is foam casting. 
The new .Saturn Corporatjon developed. a technique designed to create very 
durable and long lasting car body parts, such as fenders via foam casting. A 
conscientious PM in the business of making vehicles should consider this 
technology. He ought to consider the life-cycle costs of foam casting specifically 
to his program. Set-up costs are more expensive to initiate, but may provide costs' 
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savings over the entire production run or during the operation and support of the 
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Figure 4-1. The CommerciallNDI Decision-Making Process, (DoD, 1998) 
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The above hypothetical example may have helped demonstrate a portion of 
the PM's balancing act. Should he use a state-of the-art technology from the 
commercial sector? Should he develop a new process for this requirement? Or 
does the old process adequately meet the requirement's needs? Remember that this 
is not the only source of available technology to transfer. A quick search on the 
Internet will reveal many clearinghouses for technology transfers from 
government, commercial and' academic sources. Not to mention there are 
numerous topical publications on various technologies and processes in the 
manufacturing arena as well. The research and development area also has various 
clearinghouses for shared developments and ideas. The PM balances whether he 
should employ an existing technology from one of the abov~ sources or use one 
with which he and his contractor ~e familiar. Furthermore, he needs to decide if 
he needs to push technology forward and develop new cutting-edge technology. 
Why should a PM consider technology transfer in his program and what are 
the issues of concern for him? ,Using tested and proven technologies, a Program 
Manager can incr~ase the quality, and productivity of his program. The Program 
Manager needs to understand technology transfer beyond the scope of a simple 
definition such as the one above, 'as well as the relative importance of technology. 
Programs such as the Dual Use Science and" Technology (DU S&T) 
Program described in Chapter III help encourage as well as entice both industry 
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and the Services to get into the business of dual-use technologies. Thinking about 
dual-use technologies during the research and development assist in the goals of 
the Program Managers, in the long term. Dan Petonito, the PM for the DU S&T 
Program explained that his strategic vision for the program was that it must be a 
clearinghouse or store of dual-use technologies from which a PM could browse 
and shop to find the technology, the dual-use technology, to meet his need 
(Petonito, 1998). The realistic vision for the next millennium would be a virtual 
store in which' both, shoppers, the PMs, as well as the sellers, (industry) could 
electronically browse. PMs could interject the current and future needs, while 
industry marketers could gage the next generation of technology, 
Using dual-use technologies will help broaden the national industrial base 
in two ways. First, the desire to use commercial and nondevelopmental items will 
encourage those contractors who exist solely to meet Defense related needs to 
expand their production into the' commercial sector. Second, as we look to NDI 
solutio,ns, ~e look to a greater spectrum of industrial solutions .and are not limited 
to the strict military contractors. Thus, two benefits to the practice of looking to 
ellNOI for material solutions may be seen. Furthermore, this will become ever so 
important, as Figure 4-2 suggests that all new needs or requirements of the DoD 
will be met with some degree of commercial item or ND!. ellNDI use will not be ' 
a binary gate, yes or no. Rather, the program manager in conjunction with the 
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contracting officer will be able to tailor the program to best utilize the available 
CIINDI. 
ACQUISlll0N APPROACH FOR NEW 
NEEDS 
Integrate Commercial 




with Commercial or 
NOI Com ponents 
Figure 4-2. Commercial ItemINDI Spectrum, (DoD, 1998) 
The horizontal axis represents development· time such that the more 
development required within a program, the. greater the schedule needs to be to 
accommodate the. requirement. On the other hand, a commercially available item 
could be employed readily. Interestingly enough, the vertical axis is not labeled in 
the Defense Acquisition Deskbook. It would seem logical to appropriately label 
this axis any number of titles ranging from the most obvious costs, to risks, or even 
difficulty. Theoretically, buying a commercial item requires less time than a , 
complete total development program. Notwithstanding, it takes a great deal of 
time to research a commercial item. It should be emphasized that a PM could 
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spend a great deal of time conducting market research on a product only to 
determine he'll have to spend a greater amount of time conducting a full scale 
development program. 
By tapping dual-use technology, the PM can exploit a technology without 
having to develop it within his program. He can rely on a proven technology, or 
even a state-,of-the-art technology. Furthermore, he could take that technology and 
make it better, improving on its quality. In the current trend of budget reductions, 
it seems pragmatic for a PM to maximize his production efforts by looking to 
existing technologies for use in his program. As Figure 4-3 depicts, the services 
seem to understand the benefits. To date, there have been quite a few transfers of 
technology. It appears that the emphasis from the Administration, the SECDEF 
and the legislature, as seen in Chapter III, has been effective. Although not 
explicit, the technology transfers depicted in Figure 4-3, include dual-use 
technologies transferred into a program as well as those transferred out of a 
program. 
Not only does utilization of the commercial marketplace make sense from 
cost, schedule, and technology considerations; law also requires it. The Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) requires that Federal agencies, to 
the extent practicable, 
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Defense Department Technology Transfer Program 
Number of Reported Active Technology Transfer Mechanis ms* 
per Service/Agency 
Service FY 1995 FY 1996 
Army 552 639 
Navy 148 139 
Air Force 53 42 
Defense Advanced Research 2 2 
Projects Agency 
TOTAL 755 822 
* Technology Transfer Mechanisms include Cooperative Research and 
Development Agreements (CRADAs), Patent License Agreements, Use of 
Facility Agreements, and Personnel Exchange Agreements. 
Figure 4-3. DoD Technology Transfer Program 
Source: Department of Defense Office of Technology Transfer, 1997. 
• buy commercial items, commercial services, and non developmental 
items to meet agency needs; 
• require prime contractors and subcontractors at all levels to 
incorporate c'ommercial and nondevelopmental items as components 
of systems they develop for Federal agencies; 
• state specifications in terms that enable and encourage companies to 
s:upply commercial and nondevelopmental items; and 
• revise procurement policies, practices, and procedures -- not required 
by law -- to remove impediments to the acquisition of commercial 
items. 
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Recent Acquisition Reform initiatives suggest a reduction of the "Defense" 
industrial base simultaneo~sly with an increase in the "national" industrial base. 
U.S. Government reliance on existing technologies and products will result. Thus, 
DoD seems to be developing its dual-use technology policy in order to increase its 
interdependence with the commercial sector (DU S&T, 1998). 
Exploring both commercial items and NDI becomes part of the decision 
pro,cess for any program manager and his staff. Figure 4-1, from earlier in this . 
section, depicts a possible flow diagram of the consideration to use either 
commercial or nondevelopmental items. 
That flow chart illustrates the program manager's decision points in 
selecting commercial, NDI or developmental technology. On the surface it appears 
a single yes or no decision cycle. Realistically, this decision cycle restarts for the 
subsystems and components. A more complete picture, however, includes the 
analysis involved with the pricing of such items. This is ,the topic of the next 
section. 
2. How to Employ Dual-Use Technology 
Early in the acquisition process, before the operational requirement 
document (ORD) is validated, for example, it is possible to compare the user's 
need to the capabilities of the commercial market and determine 
• the availability of products to meet the requirement as is, 
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• the ability of suppliers to modify their products to meet the user's 
requirement, and 
• the flexibility of users to modify their requirements to allow the 
,purchase ,of commercial items, commercial services, or 
nondevelopmental items (DoD, 1998). 
As the Congress and the American public continue to scrutinize the 
Department of Defense (DoD) budget, future acquisitions will be pressured to rely 
heavily on commercial and nondevelopmental items (NDI). The program manager 
faces several challenges when choosing these dual-use technologies in his 
acquisition strategy; one challenge is determining a fair and reasonable price for 
the item. Having introduced commercial items and NDI, the next step is to 
consider development of pricing data for dual-use technologies. 
The procedures for the acquisition of NDI are neither new nor significantly' 
different from established acquisition procedures. Thus, pricing CIINDI becomes 
the major issue in employing dual-use technology. Therefore, how are dual-use 
technologies priced? Pricing CIINDI is a good representation for pricing all dual-
use technologies. Price or cost serves. as the foundation' of analytical decisions for 
dual-use employment. The primary goal in these cases is to obtain the best value 
in meeting the establish~d requirements of the user (OASD(P&L); 1990). CI or 
NDI, just as any other acquisition approach, requires appropriate analysis in order 
to protect the buyer. CIINDI offer a range of different potential solutions to the 
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need. Figure 4-2, from Section 1, depicts the spectrum of possible solutions for 
using both commercial items and NDI. Although the very ends of the spectrum 
are black and white, there exists a large, gray area in between new developments 
and off-the-shelf items. Within this gray area, CI or NDI solutions necessitate a 
trade-off analysis. 
Current acquisition procedures require market research and analysis in 
order to determine the availability and suitability of commercial and 
nondevelopmental items prior to the commencement of any developmental effort, 
during the developmental effort, and prior to the preparation of any product 
description. The DoD 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs and Major Automated Information .System Acquisition 
Programs, outlines these proced~res (DoD, 1998). Market research is also an 
important tool for identifying and buying dual-use technologies, when suitable 
commercial items are not available. 
. Market research is esseIltial to optimize the potential use of commercial 
items, commercial services, and nondevelopmental items to meet agency needs. 
Figure 4-4 depicts the broad range of considerations to be answered by market 
research. These considerations broaden and clarify DoD's understanding of 
potential CI or NDI solutions. Thorough market research may result in a fair and 
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Figure 4-4. The Focus of Market Research, (OUSD(A&T), 1997) 
Contract 
Market research has two' phases: market surveillance and market 
investigation. Market surveillance is an ongoing process and includes all the 
activities that acquisition personnel perform continuously to keep themselves 
abreast of technology and product developments in their areas of expertise. 
Market investigation, which involves more comprehensive research, is conducted 
in response to a specific materiel need or need for services (DA, 1995). 
Primary Sources For Market .surveillance Information and Data 
(DAF) 
• Industry publications, catalogs, and product data sheets. 
• Independent research and development reports and presentations. 
• Participation in professional societies and related activities. 
• Counterparts in other military services. (See DoD Pamphlet SD-l, 
"Standardization Directory.") 
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• Trade shows and industry workshops. 
• Discussions with industry representatives. 
• Foreign military data exchange. 
• Journals. 
• Internet 
The market investigation team should include representatives of the groups 
who will significantly influence the program as it progresses. These team 
members may include: 
• Potential vendors. 
• Users. 
• Operational and development testers. 
• Logistics specialists. 
• Life cycle cost analysts. 
• Program managers and engineers (OUSD(A&T), 1997). 
This list, of course, is not all-inclusive. 
Figure 4-5 portrays the essential elements of market investigation. These 
elements will provide the best picture for determining a fair and reasonable price 
of a particular NDI. A thorough market investigation truly dictates the contracting 
officer's thorough understanding ofNDI use. 
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Figure 4-5. Market Investigation Make-up, (DoD, 1998) 
3. Dual-Use Technology Resources 
Section 1 of this chapter demonstrated why a PM should employ dual-use 
technologies within his program. Section 2 showed how that should be done. This 
section explains the various resources available to assist a PM and his staff in 
acquiring systems. Finally, it is followed by a case in which dual-use technology 
was successfully employed . 
. Firs~, this section will detail how a PM must still be conscious of the 
historical perception 'of dual-use technology. He can use some existing resources, 
as he must remain wary of technology transfers out of his program. Next, this 
section presents some additional resources available to the PM and his staff in 
implementing the current trends in dual-use technology. He may then be able to . 
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use existing technologies within his program without having to initiate a totally 
developmental program. 
As a result of the former preoccupation with the prevention of unintended 
dual-use technologies, the PM had to bear the burden of the costs of the entire 
program. Thus, the PM often missed beneficial opportunities of both cooperative 
efforts and foreign military sales. Although, the name of the game is now to be the 
beneficiary of the advantages of the technologies of others in order to ultimately 
reduce risks, foreign military sales still have a critical plac.e in programs. 
As a result of FMS, PMs must still be wary of the implications of 
transferring dual-use technologies as outlined in Chapter II. However, in some 
cases, especially when a program plans to employ commercial items within its· 
acquisition strategy, foreign military sales may be practical. Some resources exist 
to help the program office in this endeavor. 
There are numerous wickets that the program office must get through in 
order to make the FMS effective. However, the PM may have security assistance 
resources available to his office in order to assist in FMS. But first, PMs need to 
have an understanding of what are the critical military technologies associated 
with dual-use technology to better use that assistance. Some of these include the 
following: (Stahlschmidt, 1989) 
• Composites 
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• Stealth & Low Observables 
• Large Scale Integrated Circuits 
• Fiber Optics 
• Command, Control and Communications Systems 
• On-Board Computers 
Not included in this .particular list, but just as important, are the missile 
technologies that fall into the dual-use categories. A PM who understands the 
various aspects of critical and dual-use technologies, in addition to the resources 
available to him will be more effective. He will be able to leverage already 
developed technologies, maximizing their use in his program. By better 
understanding the technology, the PM can utilize re~ources better aswell as make 
better decisions. In addition, he will then be able to determine when to employ 
FMS in his acquisition strategy. 
Notwithstanding, the concept of foreign military sales is not without critics. 
Several articles in the Early Bird in 1998 have reported about how FMS to Israel 
further resulted in Israel transferring that technology to China. Some critics will 
argue that the U.S. will lose its technological edge if it continues to sell its current 
weapon systems to foreign countries. .In addition, FMS made with the intention of 
"friendly" use could easily be turned to malicious means during times of crisis. 
Furthermore, some may argue that if we continue transferring these technologies, 
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all nations would eventually have them. Finally, the concerns of a PM for FMS 
may eventually become moot. Opall-Rome writing in Defense Week concluded 
that "the Emirates' [United Arab Emirates] decision to purchase the bulk of the 80-
aircraft, $7 billion F -16 package through commercial channels hammered yet 
another nail in the coffin of FMS." 1 Interesting to note is that when, or if, the 
official U.S. Government sponsored FMS program becomes obsolete, the issues 
surrounding dual-use technology may even be exacerbated for the program office. 
The PM may not be able to reap the benefits of FMS through his program. 
Likewise, he may have to be a good customer to get the attention of the contractor. 
However, FMS does not allow all technologies to be transferred. The PM 
.needs to go to already established sources of information concerning certain 
technologies. As alluded to earlier, there are the critical military technologies, to 
include those on the Missile Technologies Control Regime (MTCR). These dual-
use technologies are kept within the U.S. and its closest allies, in order to 
. . 
specifically prevent their malicious use. Albeit, they do have some very valuable 
peacetime uses, these technologies involve satellite/guided missile technologies. 
The concern for malicious use far outweighs the potential peacetime uses. Second, 
while some argue that the technological gap between nations today is closer, the 
I The implications here are tremendous. Would a U.S. firm have to hire a specific staff to work within 
each potential nation's/customer's acquisition and contracting rules? Will that earn them more profits? The 
article also does not discuss the issues associated with direct military sales, its intricacies and working with 
other U.S. Government agencies other than 000. 
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U.S. Defense complex is committed to maintaining technological superiority. 
Retired Colonel Dave Matthews, the former PM for A TACMS clearly indicated 
that· certain missiles sold to foreign countries had their critical guidance 
components compartment welded shut (Matthews, 1997). This prevented the 
disclosure of a critical technology, and thereby reduced the aforementioned 
potential for future malicious use. However, other implications resulted in a long 
logistics train when the missile needed repairs on its guidance system. This 
. logistics constraint impacts the planning and "sale-ability" of the program to a 
potential FMS customer. Even today, the U.S. has not let go of the old 
preoccupation, when considering FMS. The PM must look to the MTCR for 
approval to transfer or sell equipment in order to pr~vent malicious or unintended 
use of dual-use technologies. 
The Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) has recently 
defined another niche for it to provide assistance to the contracting officer. The 
DCMC can provide a valuable source of market analysis, "including (but not 
limited to) determining sources of commercial and nondevelopmental items and 
developing rough order of magnitUde pricing estimates" on these type items. The 
DCMC's Early Contract Administration Services (CAS) Help Center can support 
contract officers in determining a fair and reasonable price for an NDI (DoD, 
1998). 
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In addition to providing assistance to the contracting officer, this help center 
may also provide an exc~lIent resource for the program office. As a program 
manager is in the early stages of reviewing potential material solutions to a 
battlefield deficiency, the DCMC Help Center could also serve to help in the cost, 
schedule and performance planning of the program. Figure 4-2 from Section 1, 
demonstrates that decision-making process. The analysis from DCMC's help 
center can assist the PM to meet the national objectives in using NDI. However, . 
the PM's use ofNDI in his program has far reaching implications. 
Furthermore, PMs should not be overly alarmed if they are not yet educated 
about all aspects of dual-use technology. Major Karl R. Meuschke, in his 1996 
Masters Degree thesis concluded that technology transfer "sm.art" people are 
necessary for program success (Meuschke, 1996). Additionally, the program 
office designee should obtain A Program Office Guide to Technology Transfer 
from the Defense Systems Management College. Furth.ermore, the Defense 
Technology Tt:ansfer Working Group (DTTWG) might provide valuable insigh,t to 
the PM and Program Executive Officer (PEO). Such sources might contribute to 
the PM's ability to successfully employ dual-use technologies in his program. 
Established in 1994, the DTTWG has representation from each of the 
Services as well as most of the Defense agencies. The Fiscal Year 1996 agenda 
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included the following: (Extracted from the DoD Office of Technology Transfer 
Annual Report, 1996) 
• Passage of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act 
of 1995 and the attendant implementation of this law within the 
Department. 
• Participation in the Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology 
Transfer. 
• Implementation of Dr. Perry's policy memorandum of June 2, 1995, 
on Domestic Technology Transfer and Dual Use Technology 
Development (Appendix 2). 
• Use of and linkages between technology transfer homepages via 
Internet connections. 
• Further development of a Defense Technology Transfer Information 
System .. 
• Initial meeting of the Department's Technology Transfer Senior 
Managers. 
• Review of Best PracticeslLessons Learned on Technology Transfer 
processes. 
The PM or even the PEO will probably not have direct access to this 
.working group. However, the proceedings as well as various similar links are 
available electronically via the Internet, which can be valuable resources to the 
PM. In addition, other Technology Transfer Working Groups at lower levels will 
develop as the PM's plan takes effect. DTTWGs provide valuable insight for ideas 
of employing dual-use technologies. 
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C. LESSONS LEARNED 
THE ARMY SNIPER RIFLE: CASE & POINT 
Market research of NDI can help shape the requirement phase of the 
acquisition process. The Defense Acquisition Deskbook, (DAD) further depicts an 
example of how the Army used market research in determining its requirement. 
The draft requirement for the Army's M-24 Sniper Rifle required a probability of 
hit of .95 at 800 meters. Indications from market research revealed "the required 
,probability of hit might be too high to attain." The acquisition team evaluating the 
market investigation data recommended relaxing the requirement. After review, 
the requirement of hit probability became a range between .85 and .95 at the 800-
meter range. The team's logic was that .85 was at least comparable to the hit 
probability of the existing USMC M-40A 1 sniper rifle. Furthermore, also based 
on their market research the team recommended reducing the service life of the 
weapon from 15,000 to 10,000 rounds (DoD, 1998). 
The market research of NDI revealed a practi,cal change to the requirement 
resulting in the Army understanding a great deal about the item, in particular, the 
appropriate price range. Although maximum use of commercial and NDI 
components and subsystems is encouraged, the Government developer should 
evaluate the risks of assuming the responsibility for integrating commercial and 
NDI components and subsystems into a complex system. Figure 4-1 from Section 
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1, demonstrates the risk factor of time 10 determining the degree to which 
commercial items and NDI are used. 
However, modifi.cation of a commercial or non-developmental item results 
in a partial development effort and must be handled accordingly. Many of the 
cost, risk, schedule, and supportability benefits may be jeopardized as a result of 
modification, and it is important to reevaluate the use of a nondevelopmental or 
commercial item in light of the specific planned modifications.· The test and 
logistics support plans must take the scope of the modification into account to 
ensure the success of the effort. 
The cost of integrating several NDI or NDI into another program must not 
outweigh the benefits realized by using the NDI in the first place. The price of the 
NDI is one aspect of evaluating this cost benefit analysis. Other issues involve the 
supportability and maintainability of the particular items. The Army Sniper Rifle 
Case seems to portray an exemplar of dual-use technology employment. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed the factors. impacting on a PM's decision to employ 
dual-use technology. It further studied the factors a PM consi4ers in how he 
employs dual-use technology. Finally, it examined at the resources a PM could 
use in the application of dual-use technology in a system acquisition. The Army 
Sniper Rifle Case captures this analysis. 
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v. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this thesis was to study the use of dual-use technologies 
within a program. To explore this subject, the researcher reviewed the historical 
perspective of dual-use technologies as well as the current trends in today's era. 
The researcher also analyzed the application of dual-use technologies. This 
chapter presents the conclusions of this thesis, offers recommendations, answers 
the primary and subsidiary research questions, and suggests areas for further 
research. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Dual-use technologies can provide the necessary cost savings to 
continue to produce leadjng-edge technologies during this era of 
reduced Defense budgets. The decision to employ dual-use 
technology must be made carefully and consciously. 
Dual-use technology is essentially that technology which has both 
commercial· and military use or capabilities. It may be an item, in the fonn of a CI 
or NDI, or it may be a process, having the ability to reduce production costs. 
Dual-use technologies help sustain the Defense and national industrial base. Some 
predominately Defense contractors, for example Lockheed Martin, have seen their 
research and development funds erode. They too look toward the possibilities of 
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partnering with the Government to reap any benefits they can as they attempt to 
commercialize products. 
The funding efforts of the Technology Reinvestment Program, and now the 
Dual Use Science and Technology Program, demonstrate DoD's desires and 
willingness to promote dual-use technology developments. Furthermore, with the 
waiver of specific rules within the program, such as FAR compliance, DoD '" 
effectively attract non-traditional DoD contractors. Attracting these contractors 
SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE COST 
BY LIFE CYCLE COST CATEGO'RY 
OPERATING & SUPPORT 
Source: Boudreau, 1998 Figure 5-1 
early in the acquisition cycle is imperative. 
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Based on the System Life Cycle Cost graph, Figure 5-1, we understand 
most program costs occur during the sustainment phases and are paid with 
Operations and Support (O&S) (Boudreau, 1998). Successful implementation of 
dual-use technology can effectively reduce the O&S bulge. In addition, a 
coordinated effort of DoD and the commercial sector can continue to successfully 
push the dual-use opportunities. 
2. The application of dual-use technologies, should be concentrated 
at the early stages of an acquisition strategy and implemented as 
early in the process as possible. 
Based on the Early Decision chart, Figure 5-2, it is clear that most decisions 
that affect a program's life cycle costs are made ra,ther early in its acquisition life· 
(Boudreau, 1998). For example, 70% of decisions are made by Milestone I. In 
addition, we know that as changes are made later in a program, they cost more 
(Boudreau, 1998). [See Figure 5-3, The Benefits chart.] All of these expensive, 
critical decisions point to making the decisions about acquisition strategy carefully 
and decisively. More importantly, it means to take the time up-front and early, 
making calculated decisions for life cycle support. These decisions need to 
include early evaluation of dual-use, technologies, from which crucial costs and 
design changes will be reduced. 
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3. Market research is a key element in successful employment of a 
dual-use technology strategy. 
CI and NDI acquisition programs are in the current trend to procure items 
for Defense cheaper, faster and better than a full-scale development program .. CI 
'and· NDI use is a potential solution to an acquisition that may offer significant 
payoffs in terms of cost and time because ClfNDI has already been developed and 
should also have an operating history (OASD(P&L), 1990). Understanding where 
and how CIfNDI fit into a program, as well as exploring the particular pricing I 
information can reveal a great deal about the material solution. Poor market 
research may hinder appropriate application of ClfNDI to a battlefield deficiency. 
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To counter this potential weakness, the program manager and contracting 
officer must ensure that thorough market surveillance and investigation are 
completed to identify CIINDI solutions and to justify and validate the determined 
fair and reason;lble price. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a result of this research, the following recommendations are presented: 
1. DoD needs to establish and maintain a centralized 
"clearinghouse" for dual-use technologies. 
Establishing a coordinated effort for the application of dual-use 
technologies via the World Wide Web would continue to help the current trend of 
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dual-use technology initiatives. Section 2 of Chapter IV showed all of the various 
sources of market information. Yet, a centralized source would provide a valuable 
resource to PMs. It would provide the continuous availability of capabilities for 
the Program Manager to apply within his program. In addition, it would also apply 
to the inverse: PMs looking for a particular technological idea could essentially 
place a "want ad" requesting the commercial sector industries to cooperate and 
participate. Furthermore, this virtual "store" of technologies could share lessons 
learned and best practices in employing dual-use technologies. 
2. Develop quantifiable metrics from which to measure success of a 
dual-use employment. 
Section 3 of Chapter IV demonstrated the various resources to assist PMs in 
employing dual-use technology. However, very littie follow-up has been done on 
how well those resources aided the dual-use employme~t. 
Employing dual-use technologies seems to be a log~cal method of 
sustaining the industrial base during this reduced budget era. The Department of 
Defense needs to focus some effort on seeing how the employment of dual-use 
technologies has lowered cost, reduced schedule and provided a merging of the 
Defense and national industrial base. There seems to be a lack of quantifiable data 
to substantiate these benefits .. Yet, the benefits are completely intuitive to many in 
the acquisition business. 
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3. Base success of a program upon the substantial employment of 
dual-use technologies with the focus on early employment to save 
money in the procurement, and operations and support (O&S) of 
a program's life cycle costs. Look to see if the myriad of 
resources is providing quantifiable cost savings for the program 
office. 
Dual-use technology offers advantages to both the Government as well as 
the civilian sector in the form of lower costs and shared risks. The opportunities 
exist, primarily in the procurement and O&S costs to maximize. scarce critical 
resources through an interdependence of the Defense and commercial sectors. 
Application of dual-use technologies can provide this necessary melding an~ 
ultimately substantiate total ownership cost reductions. 
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question: What is. dual-use technology and 
how has it impacted program management? 
As a form of technology transfer, dual-use technologies can assist a PM and 
. . 
his staff in meeting the cost, schedule. and performance requirements of the 
program. Leveraging reduced cycle-time, lowered costs and proven technologies 
of dual-use items can also bring-in additional funds to the program office. Both 
Executive Order 12591 and the Secretary of Defense's June 1995 memorandum 
echo the importance of dual-use technologies. The DoD 5000 series repeats the 
same imperative· that the PM shall employ dual-use technologies, and to the 
maximum extent possible. 
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To encourage the employment of dual-use technologies, current acquisition 
reforms include dual-use technology imperatives whereby a program office can 
win award seed money to further their initiatives. A PM and his staff must be 
familiar with the market trends in which their office exists. Consideration of dual-
use technologies is a must for all program offices. However, successful 
employment may result in another set of equally difficult challenges. A program 
staff requiring more knowledge about dual-use initiatives can call 1-800-DUAL- . 
USE to obtain additional guidance. 
2. Subsidiary Research Question: What is the application of dual-
use technology? How does dual-use technology apply to program 
management? 
The mitigation of risks through avoidance is no longer a ~nancially sound 
solution in program acquisition. It is simply too costly to do so. Thus, in some 
ways, the job of the PM is more difficult. He must temper the 'possibility of 
critical technology leakage with that of the benefits he may gain from its 
exploitation. 
Moreover, the focus is now on borrowing others' technologies with less of a 
worry on what technologies are bleeding out from the program. If the PM can 
utilize mostly CIfNDI components or subsystems, he has to worry less about 
technology'leaking from his program. As the reliance on CI and NDI increases, 
these concerns are naturally mitigated as the technology base for Defense and the 
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nation are mutually dependent. It does, however, create more of a difficult 
management problem for the program office. 
3. Subsidiary Research Question: What is the relationship between 
the trend toward a national industrial base vice a Defense 
industrial base and dual-use technology? 
Employment of dual-use technologies fosters the trend toward a joint 
industrial base. Any efforts, such as the TRP or DUS&T Program, can only prove 
to move closer towards a merged national and Defense industrial base. Substantial 
" , 
employment of CI and NDI over time will serve to meld the two sectors together. 
4. Subsidiary Research Question: How do commercial items (el) 
and non-developmental items (NDI) relate to dual-use 
technology? 
Employment of dual-use technology essentially means the use of 
commercial and nondevelopmental items. This application should not only be in 
the form of a system, but can be in the component or subsystem level." 
The October 1990 guide to buying [CI and] NDI explained 
... an advantage to [CI and] NpI is that it usually has a performance 
history addressing these issues that can be used to reduce or 
eliminate additional efforts required to resolve them (OASD(P&L), 
1990). 
Although the document itself is somewhat dated, the quote holds true today. 
In addition, pricing history should similarly exist, further assisting the program 
manager in determining a fair and reasonable price. Part of market research 
includes exploring historical prices. The Contract Pricing Reference Guide details 
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some areas containing historical pricing data, which may be used during market 
research (CPRG, 1997-8). These data reflect a great deal of pricing factors to 
consider during market r:esearch. 
Additionally, using CIINDI has its risks. The program manager must 
ensure he has a complete understanding of the degree to which CIINDI will be 
employed. Included in this understanding is having the answers to certain 
questions concerning pricing of the CIINDI.I The primary intent of using NDI is 
to streamline the acquisition life-cycle process, greatly reducing the time to field a 
particular item. However, full and complete comprehension of the pricing 
associated with NDI will prepare the contracting officer in his quest toward 
obtaining a fair and reasonable price. 
5. Subsidiary Research Question: What are the significant 
differences in procuring these items? 
Market analysis is the key factor in procuring dual-use technologies. The 
program manager must be thoroughly knowledgeable about his product, 
specifically the technologies associated with it. He does not, however, need to be 
the technology expert. To get this intimate familiarity, the PM not only needs to 
get technology transfer-smart people in his program, but he needs to maintain his 
own understanding. To gain this understanding, he can look to trade journals, 
I The CPRG outlines in great detail a list of questions that may be applicable to the contracting officer. It 
serves as an outstanding tool for him in the conduct of his market research. 
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trade shows as well as the Internet to stay abreast of the dual-use technology 
possibilities. 
6. Subsidiary Research Question: What impact has dual-use 
technology had on the PMO and does it pose any significant 
problems for the program manager? 
As the Clinton Administration and the Department of Defense (DoD) move 
toward greater reliance on technology transfer, the Program Manager must arm 
himself with a basic understanding of technology transfer. The issues of foreign 
military sales &s well as the dual-use technologies are all inter-related into the 
over-arching issue of technology transfer. 
The PM must then weigh the costs and benefits (advantages and 
disadvantages) in deciding on what technology transfer oppo~unities, if any, make 
sense for his program: He must fully understand the implications of FMS. The 
PM should review and consider collaborative efforts between the commercial and 
Defense efforts, assisting in the preservation of the u.s. industrial base. 
After applyin'g these initial factors to his particular program, the PM can 
then further focu~ in-depth efforts on achieving those specific technology transfer 
goals. Although this paper is not exhaustive, nor is it specifically detailed, it 
should provide a beginning to the technology transfer designee in 'a program' 
management office. From here, the selected individual can converge on and 
research the applicable databases and procedures for the program office's needs. 
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7. Subsidiary Research Question: What is the relationship between 
dual-use technologies and technology transfer? 
The concept of dual-use technologies has evolved over time. Any 
technology transfer from the commercial sector into the military or vice versa is 
considered a dual-use technology. Historically, PMs were concerned with the loss 
of critical technologies and their potential for future employment for malicious 
ends. Whereas this remains a concern, the focus for PMs today is to see what 
technology they can assimilate into their program from others, especially from the 
commercial sector. 
The first issue involves the spread of technology from a PM's program to 
another source. This case was the greatest concern for the Government when the 
transfer was international and "denial" of a particular technology was imperative. 
The second perspective concerns a PM using already proven technology in his 
program. Since this technology exists, a PM who uses it can save money. As an 
integral part of dual-use technology, these two manners of technology transfer co-
exist. 
8. Subsidiary Research Question: May the U.S. Military lose its 
technological, competitive edge over its adversaries due to its 
dual-use initiatives? 
The underlying concern for Defense acquisition is to use the most cost-
effective source of supply throughout a system's life cycle. The desire to rely on 
the national industrial base for Defense acquisition should not pose a threat to U.S. 
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Defense capabilities. The Program manager has the responsibility to ensure 
thorough research is completed. "When there is an indication that industrial 
capabilities needed by poD are in danger of being lost, [the program office] shall 
perform an analysis to determine whether government action is required to 
preserve an industrial capability vital to national security" (DoD, 1998). 
The use of the MCTR may seem futile, because many countries eventually 
develop critical technologies over time. Yet, during the Cold War, it served its 
purpose of reducing or at least slowing the spread of crucial technologies in the 
missile delivery area. For the hawks that are still concerned about the spread of 
dual-use technologies, maybe the focus needs to be broadened to include other 
technologies. Be wary of the regulatory consequences. More bureaucracy for the 
PM will result in work-arounds instead of its intended purpose. 
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Foreign companies involvement in the application of dual-use 
technologies. 
The U.S. needs to balance its decision concerning critical technologies. 
Since it is clearly more cost effective· to buy commercial items, it may seem 
practicable to look to pot~ntial foreign commercial items as well. 
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2. Review the measured effects of the TRP and predict the savings 
anticipated through its survivor, the Dual-Use Science and 
Technology Program. 
As of October 1998, the results of the initial Technology Reinvestment 
Program were being collated (Petonito, 1998). An analysis of the anticipated cost 
savings could help predict future life cycle costs savings. In addition, it could help 
determine where to focus dual-use technology efforts and resources for the Dual 
Use Science and Technology Program. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter brought together the aspects of this thesis in some conclusions 
and recommendations about dual-use technology. It then answered the specific 
research questions this thesis setout to explore. Finally, in concluding the thesis, it 
posed; ,me additional research areas fo~ the basis of follow-on study. 
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APPENDIX A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12591 
Facilitating access to science and technology 
* * * * Text or body of the decision or law * * * * 
Source: The provisions of Executive Order 12591 of Apr. 10, 1987, appear 
at 52 FR 13414, 3 CFR, 1987 Comp., p. 220, unless otherwise noted. 
By the authority vested in me as President by the. Constitution and laws of 
the United States of America, including the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 
1986 (Public Law 99 - 502), the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984 (Public Law 
98 - 620), and the University and Small 
Business Patent Procedure Act of 1980 (Public Law 96 - 517), and in order 
to ensure that Federal agencies and laboratories assist universities and the private 
sector in broadening our technology base by moving new knowledge from the 
research laboratory into the development of new products and processes, it is 
hereby ordered as follows: 
Section 1. Transfer of Federally Funded Technology. 
(a) The head of each Executive department and agency, to the extent 
pennitted by law, shall encourage and facilitate collaboration among Federal 
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laboratories, State and local governments, universities, and the private sector, 
particularly small business, in order to assist in the transfer of technology to the 
marketplace. 
(b) The head of each Executive department and agency shall, within overall 
funding allocations and to the extent permitted by law: 
(I) delegate authority to its government-owned, government-operated 
Federal laboratories: 
(A) to enter into cooperative research and development agreements with 
other Federal laboratories, State and local governments, universities, and the 
private sector; and 
(B) to license, assign, or waive rights to intellectual property developed by 
the laboratory either under such cooperative research Or development agreements 
and from within individual laboratories. 
(2) identify and encourage persons to act as conduits between and among 
Federal laboratories, universities, and the private sector· for the transfer of 
technology developed from Federally funded research and development efforts; 
(3) ensure that State and local governments, universities, and the private 
sector are provided with information on the technology, expertise, and facilities 
available in F ederallaboratories; 
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(4) promote the commercialization, in accord with my Memorandum to the 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies of February 18, 1983, of patentable 
results of Federally funded research by granting to all contractors, regardless of 
size, the title to patents made in whole or in part with Federal funds, in exchange 
for royalty-free use by or on behalf ofthe government; 
(5) administer all patents and licenses to inventions made with Federal 
assistance, which are owned by the non-profit contractor or grantee, in accordance 
with Section 202( c )(7) of Title 35 of the United States Code as amended by Public 
Law 98 - 620, without regard to limitations on licensing found in that section prior 
to amendment or in Institutional Patent Agreements now in effect that were 
entered into before that law was enacted on November 8, 1984, unless, in the case 
of an invention that has not been marketed, the funding. agency determines, based 
on information in its files, that the contractor or grantee has not taken adequate 
steps to market the inventions, in accordance with applicable law or an 
. Institutional Patent Agreement; 
(6) cooperate, under policy guidance provided by the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy, with the heads of other affected departments and agencies in 
the development of a uniform policy permitting Federal contractors to retain rights 
to software, engineering drawings, and other technical data generated by Federal 
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grants and contracts, in exchange for royalty-free use by or on behalf of the 
government. 
[Sec. 1 amended by EO 12618 of Dec. 22, 1987,52 FR 48661,3 CFR, 1987 
Comp., p. 262] 
Sec. 2. Establishment of the Technology Share Program. 
The Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, and Health and Human 
Services and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration shall select one or more of their Federal laboratories to participate 
in the Technology Share Program. Consistent with. its mission and policies and 
within its overall funding allocation in any year, each Federal laboratory so 
selected shall: 
(a) Identify areas of research and technology of potential importance to 
long- term national economic competitiveness and in which the laboratory 
possesses special competence and/or unique facilities; 
(b) Establish a mechanism through which the laboratory performs research 
in areas ident.ified in Section 2(a) as a participant of a consortium composed of 
United States industries and universities. All consortia so established shall have, at 
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a minimum, three individual companies that conduct the majority of their business 
in the United States; and 
(c) Limit its participation in any consortium so established to the use of 
laboratory personnel and facilities. However, each laboratory may also provide 
financial support generally not to exceed 25 percent of the total budget for the 
activities of the consortium. Such financial support by any laboratory in all such 
consortia shall be limited to a maximum of $5 million per annum. 
Sec. 3. Technology Exchange -- Scientists and Engineers. 
The Executive Director of the President's Commission' on Executive 
Exchange shall assist Federal agencies, where appropriate, by. developing and 
implementing an exchange program whereby scientists and engineers in the private 
sector may take temporary assignments in Federal laboratories, and scientists and 
engineers ,in Federal laboratories may take temporary assigp.ments in the private 
sector. 
Sec. 4. International Science and Technology. 
In order to ensure that the United States benefits from and fully exploits 
scientific research and technology developed abroad, 
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(a) The head of each Executive department and agency, when negotiating or 
entering into cooperative research and development agreements and licensing 
arrangements with foreign persons or industrial organizations(where these entities 
are directly or indirectly controlled by a foreign company or government), shall, in 
consultation with the United States Trade Representative, give appropriate 
consideration: 
(I) to whether such foreign companies or governments permit and 
encourage United States agencies, organizations, or persons to enter into 
cooperative research and development agreements and licensing arrangements on a 
comparable basis; 
(2) to whether those foreign governments have policies to protect the 
United States intellectual property rights; and 
(3) where cooperative research will involve data, technologies, or products 
subject to national security export controls under the laws of the United States, to 
whether those foreign governments have adopted adequate measures to prevent the 
transfer of strategic technology to 
destinations prohibited under such national security export controls, either 
through participation in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls (COCOM) or through other international agreements to which the United 
States and such foreign governments are signatories. 
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(b) The Secretary of State shall develop a recruitment policy that 
encourages scientists and engineers from other Federal agencies, academic 
institutions, and industry to apply for assignments in embassies of the United 
States; and 
(c) The Secretaries of State and Commerce and the Director of the National 
Science Foundation shall develop a central mechanism for the prompt and efficient 
dissemination of science and technology information developed abroad to users in 
, Federal laboratories, academic institutions, and the private sector on a fee-for-
service basis. 
Sec. 5. Technology Transfer from the Department of Defense. 
Within 6 months of the date of this Order, the Secretary of Defense shall 
identify a list of funded technologies that would be potentially useful to United 
States industries and universities. The Secretary shall then accelerate efforts to 
make these technologies more readily available to United States industries and 
universities. 
Sec. 6. Basic Science and Technology Centers. 
The head of each Executive department and agency shall examine the 
potential for including the establishment of university research centers in 
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engineering, science, or technology in the strategy and planning for any future 
research and developme~t programs. Such university centers shall be jointly 
funded by the Federal Government, the private sector, and, where appropriate, the 
States and shall focus on areas of fundamental research and technology that are 
both scientifically promising and have the potential to contribute to the Nation's 
long-term economic competitiveness. 
Sec. 7. Reporting Requirements. 
(a) Within 1 year from the date of this Order, the Director of the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy shall convene an interagency task force comprised 
of the heads of representative agencies and the directors of representative Federal 
laboratories, or their designees, in order to identify and disseminate creative 
approaches to technology transfer from Federal laboratories. The task force will 
report to the President on the progress of and problems with technology transfer 
from Federal .laboratories. 
(b) Specifically, the report shall include: 
(1) a listing of current technology transfer programs and an assessment of 
the effectiveness of these programs; 
(2) identification of new or creative approaches to technology transfer that 
might serve as model programs for Federal laboratories; 
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(3) criteria to assess the effectiveness and impact on the Nation's economy 
of planned or future technology transfer efforts; and 
(4) a compilation and assessment of the Technology Share Program 
established in Section 2 and, where appropriate, related cooperative research and 
development venture programs. 
Sec. 8. Relation to Existing Law. 
Nothing in this Order shall affect the continued applicability of any existing 
laws or regulations relating to the transfer of United States technology to other 
nations. The head of any Executive department or agency may exclude from 
consideration, under this Order, any technology that woul.d be, if transferred, 
detrimental to the interests of nati?nal security. . 
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APPENDIX B. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
2 JUN 1995 
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MELITARY 
DEPARTMENTS 
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE 
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING 
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE 
GENERAL COUNSEL 
INSPECTOR GENERAL 
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION· 
ASSISTANTS OF ADMIMSTRATION AND MANAGEMENT DIRECTORS 
OF DEFENSE AGENCIES 
SUBJECT: DoD Domestic Technology TransferlDual Use Technology 
Development Domestic Technology Transfer and Dual Use Technology 
Development (DTTIDUTD) are integral elements of the Department's pursuit of its 
national security mission. They must have a priority role in all DoD acquisition 
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programs and must be recognized as key activities of the DoD laboratories, DoD 
Domestic Technology TransferlDual Use Technology Development encompass: 
• Spin-off activities that demonstrate non-Defense, e.g. commercial, 
viability of technologies already developed or presently being 
developed for national security purposes. The primary purpose of 
these activities, which encompass much of what has been 
traditionally called "technology transfer", is to promote and make 
available existing DoD owned or developed technologies and 
technical infrastructure to a broad spectrum of non-Defense 
applications. 
• Dual-use science and technology activities that develop technologies 
having both Defense and non-Defense applications. 
• Spin-on promotion activities that demonstrate the national security 
utility of technology developed outside of the DoD. 
These activities are intended to ensure that DoD programs make the 
best possible use of national scientific and technical' capabilities. Commercial 
availability of DoD developed technologies can be expected to lower the costs of 
acquiring military equipment by providing the opportunity to take advantage of 
economies of scale and buy from a much larger commercial industrial base. 
Concurrently, such activities ensure that the civil sector receives the maximum 
possible benefit from the natio~'s national security investments. This 
memorandum reinforces the importance of DTTIDUTD activities for 
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accomplishment of the DoD mission and defines oversight authority and 
procedures for their execution. 
The Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) is the 
oversight authority for execution of all DTTIDUTD science and technology 
matters. As appropriate, coordination will be accomplished with the Assistant 
Secretary for Economic Security on dual-use technology policy issues and with 
other DOD authorities for matters under their oversight. 
In accordance with 10 U.S. C ss 2 5 IS, DDR&E (acting through its 
Office of Technology Transition) is responsible for monitoring all DoD research, 
and development activities to identify technologies and technology advancements 
. that have DTTIDUTD potential; serving as a clearinghouse for, coordinating and 
otherwise actively. facilitating technology transfers providing private. firms with 
assistance in resolving problems impacting technology transfer; and coordinating 
with other Federal departments on matters involving technology transfer. 
All DoD laboratories, as defined by 15 U. S. C. ·ss 3 7 1 Oa(d)2, and 
other organizations responsible for RDT &E activities must make DTTIDUTD a 
priority element in the accomplishment of their science and technology programs. 
Military department R&D executives, Defense agency directors, laboratory 
directors (and the executives to whom laboratory directors report) and other S&T 
managers are responsible for planning, budgeting and executing DTTIDUTD 
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programs and their performance appraisals will include evaluation of their 
organizations' DTTIDUTD activities. 
As part of the DoD budget process, the DDR&E shall define core 
DTTIDUTD activities and provide policy guidance for component investments in 
these activities, coordinating with other DoD officials as appropriate. Core DTTI 
DUTD activities shall include such items as: 
• technology assessments to ascertain commercialization potential; 
• DTTIDUTD marketing and outreach-
• engaging consultants to provide advice on technology transfer; 
• payment of salaries and travel expenses of scientific, engineering, 
and legal personnel and Office of Research and Technology 
Application personnel involved In DTTIDUSD, to include costs 
associated with initiation/negotiation of Cooperative Research and 
Development Agreements (CRADAS) and other agreements; 
• pilot spin-on demonstrations; 
• DTTIDUTD training; 
• payment of expenses associated with short-term technical assistance 
and consulting; 
• development and maintenance of a 'comprehensive DoD-vAde 
DTTIDUTD database; 
• funding the cost of accelerating patents; and 
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• administration ofDTTIDUTD achievement awards. 
As is current practice, other activities relevant to DTTIDUTD, such as 
DoD organizations' contributions to CRADAS (which must be consistent with the 
participating organizations I assigned missions), will be funded from the 
appropriate mission element funds or, in the case of Organizations that utilize 
Defense Bu.siness Operations Fund (DBOF) procedures, a program element for 
DTTIDUTD support. In line with the Department's new ,acquisition strategy, it is 
anticipated that steadily increasing percentages of RDT &E and other acquisition 
investments will involve cooperative partnerships and other efforts that involve 
dual-use technology development and spin-of(and spin,-on of technologies. 
The Military Departments and components designated by DDR&E 
shall submit an annual report to DDR&E in time for the President's budget 
submission covering all laboratory and other organizations' technology transfer 
activities for the year preceding the date of the report. This report shall include 
both budgetary data and descriptions of achievements in technology transfer. 
In coordination with appropriate authorities within OSD, DDR&E 
will develop more detailed guidance for DTTI DUTD, to include matters related to 
the personnel and awards systems, acquisition reform and legal concerns. 
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This memorandum supersedes any confiding provisions of existing 
Department of Defense Directives and guidance. The DDR&E, in coordination 
with the Director of Administration and Management and appropriate officials of 
the Department, shall prepare, for my approval, directives and/or revisions to 
directives to incorporate the substance of this memorandum in the Department of 
Defense Directives System. 
William J. Perry 
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APPENDIX C. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Stevenson-Wydler'Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (PL 96-480)[15 
USC 3701-3714] 
• Focused on dissemination of information. 
• Required Federal Laboratories to take an active role in technical 
cooperation. , 
• Established Offices of Research and Technology Application at . 
major Federal laboratories. 
• Established the Center for the Utilization of Federal Technology (in 
the National Technical Information Service). 
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (PL 96-517) 
• Permitted universities, not-for-profits, and small businesses to obtain 
title to inventions developed with governmental support. 
• Provided early on intellectual property rights protection of invention 
descriptions from public dissemination and FOIA. 
• Allowed government-owned, government-operated (aOCO) 
laboratories to grant exclusive licenses to patents. 
Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 (PL 97-219) 
• ,Required agencies to provide special funds for small business R&D 
connected to the agencies' missions. 
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• Established the Small Business Innovation Research Program 
(SBIR) 
Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (PL 98-462) 
• Eliminated treble damage aspect of antitrust concerns of companies 
wishing to pool research resources and engage in joint 
precompetitive R&D. 
• Resulted in Consortia: Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC) 
. and Microelectronics and Computer Technology' Corporation 
(MCC), among others. 
Trademark Clarification Act of 1984 (PL 98-620) 
• Permitted decisions to be made at the laboratory level in 
government-owned, contraCtor-operated (GOCO) laboratories as to 
the awarding licenses for patents. 
• Permitted contractors to receive patent royalties for use in R&D, 
awards, or for education. 
• Permitted private companies, regardless of size, to obtain exclusive 
licenses. 
• Permitted laboratories run by universities and non-profit institutions 
to retain title to inventions within limitations. 
Japanese Technical Literature Act of 1986 (PL 99-382) 
• Improved the availability of Japanese science and engineering 
literature in the U.S. 
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Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (PL 99-502) 
• Made technology transfer a responsibility· of all Federal laboratory 
scientists and engineers. 
• Mandated that technology transfer responsibility be considered in 
employee performance evaluations. 
• Established principle of royalty sharing for Federal inventors (15% 
minimum) and set up a reward system for other innovators. 
• . Legislated a charter for Federal Laboratory Consortium for 
Technology Transfer and provided a funding mechanism for that 
organization to carry out its work. 
• Provided specific requirements, incentives and authorities for the 
Federal Laboratories. 
• Empowered each agency to give the director of GOCO laboratories 
authority to enter into cooperative R&D agreements and negotiate 
licensing agreements with streamlined headquarters review. 
• Allowed laboratories to make advance agreements with large and 
small companies on title and license to inventions resulting from 
Cooperative R&D Agreements (CRDAs) with government 
laboratories. 
• Allowed Directors of GOGO laboratories to negotiate licensing 
agreements for inventions made at their laboratories. 
• Provided for exchanging GOGO laboratory personnel, services, and 
equipment with their research partners. 
• Made it possible to grant and waive rights to GOGO laboratory 
inventions and intellectual property. 
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• Allowed current and former Federal employees to participate in 
commercial development, to the extent there is no conflict of 
interest. 
Malcom Baldrige National Quality Improvement Act of 1987 CPL 100-107) 
• Established categories and criteria for the Malcom Baldrige National 
Industry Award. 
Executive Orders 12591 and 12618 (1987): Facilitating Access to Science 
and Technology 
• Promoted the commercialization of science and technology. 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 CPL 100-418) 
• Placed emphasis on the need for public/private cooperation on 
assuring full use of results and resources. 
• Established centers for transferring manufacturing technology. 
• Established Industrial Extension Services within states and an 
inf~rmation clearinghouse on successful state and local technology 
programs. 
• Changed the name of the National Bureau of Standards to the 
National Institute· of Standards and Technology and broadened its 
technology transfer .role. 
• Extended royalty payment requirements to non-government 
employees of Federal laboratories. 
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• Authorized Training Technology Transfer centers administered by 
the Department of Education. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology Authorization Act for FY 
1989 (PL 100-519) 
• Established a Technology Administration within the Department of 
Commerce. 
• Permitted contractual consideration for rights to intellectual property 
other than patents in cooperative research and development 
agreements. 
• Included software development contributors eligible for awards. 
• Clarified the rights of guest worker inventors regarding royalties. 
Water Resources Development Act ot 1988 (PL 100-676) 
• Authorized Army Corps of Engineers laboratories and research 
centers to enter· into cooperative research and development 
agreements. 
• Allowed the Corps to fund up to 50% of the cost of the cooperative 
project. 
National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act of 1989 (PL 101-
189)(included as Section 3131 et seq. of DoD Authorization Act for FY 1990) 
• Granted GOCO Federal laboratories opportunities to enter into 
CRDAs and other activities with universities and private industry, 
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under essentially the same ways as highlighted under the Federal 
Technology Transfer Act of 1986. 
• Allowed information and innovations, brought, into, and created 
through cooperative agreements to be protected from disclosure. 
• Provided a technology transfer mission for the nuclear weapons 
laboratories. 
Defense Authorization Act for FYI991 CPL 101-510) 
• Established model programs for national Defense laboratories to 
demonstrate successful relationships betwe'en Federal government, 
state and local governments, and small businesses. 
• Provided for a Federal laboratory to enter into a contract or 
memorandum of understanding with a partnership intermediary to 
perform services related to cooperative or joint activities with small ' 
businesses. ' , 
• Provided for development and implement~tion of a National Defense 
Manufacturing Technology Plan. 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 CPL 102-240) 
• Authorized the Department of Transportation to provide not more 
than 50% of the cost of CRADAs for highway research and 
development. 
• Encouraged innovative solutions to highway problems and 
stimulated the marketing of new technologies on a cost shared basis 
of more than 50% if there is substantial public interest or benefit. 
96 
American Preeminence Act 1991 (PL 102-245) 
• Extended FLC mandate, removed FLC responsibility for conducting 
a grant program, and required the inclusion of the results of an 
independent annual audit in the FIC Annual Report to Congress and 
the President. 
• Included intellectual property as potential contributions under 
CRADAs. 
• Required the Secretary of Commerce to report on the advisability of 
authoring a new form of CRADA that permits Federal contributions 
of funds. 
• Allowed laboratory directors to give excess equipment to educational 
institutions and nonprofit organizations as a gift. 





Established a 3 year pilot program - Small Business Technology 
Transfer (STtR), at DoD, DoE, HHS, NASA, and NSF. 
Directed the Small Business Administration (SBA) to oversee and 
coordinate the implementation ofthe STTR Program. 
Des.igned the STTR similar to the Small Business Innovation 
Research SBIR program. 
Required each of the five agencies to fund cooperative R&D projects 
involving a small company and a researcher at a university, 




National Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1993 (PL 102-25) 
• Facilitated and encouraged technology transfer to small businesses. 





Established the DoD Office of Technology Transition 
Extended the streamlining of small business technology transfer 
procedures for non-federal laboratory contractors. 
Directed DoE to issue guidelines to facilitate technology transfer to 
small businesses. 
Extended the potential for CRADAs to some DoD-funded Federally 
Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) not owned by 
the government. 
National Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1994 (PL 103-160) 
• Broadened the definition of a laboratory to include weapons 
production facilities of the DoE. 
National Techn,_ .ogy Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (PL 104-113) 






















APPENDIX D. ACRONYMS 
Acquisition Executive 
Contract Administration Services 
Commercial Item 
Contract Pricing Reference Guide 
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement 
Defense Acquisition Deskbook 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (formerly 
ARPA) 
Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management 
Department of Defense 
Department of Defense Directive 
Defense Systems Management Colle~e 
Defense Technical Information Center 
Defense Technology Transfer Working Group 
Dual Use Science & T~chnology Program 
Dual Use Applications Program 
Evolutionary Acquisition 
Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 
Foreign Military Sales 

















Integrated Product Team 
Missile Technology Control Regime 
Nondevelopmentalltem 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and 
Logistics) 
Office of Management and Budget 
Operational Requirements Document 
Operations and Support 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and 
Technology 
Program Executive Officer 
Program Manager 
Program Management Office 
Secretary of Defense 
Standardization Document 
Technology Reinvestment Program 
United Arab Emirates 
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